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CASE NOTES
Judge McQuillin cites cases on the construction of pension statutes which
disfavor a strained and unreasonable construction° and urge that the con-
struction should protect both the municipality and the employee. 41
. . . 
the courts will consider the obvious purposes and objects sought
to be attained and will construe the language used, . to the end of
giving it vitality and efficiency in the accomplishment of such pur-
poses and objects. [Citations omitted.] Pension acts should be so
construed as to avoid an inequitable result ... favoring one member
over another.42
Pension planning is a long-range proposition. It seems unrealistic to
expect social legislation of the type here in question to be effective and,
at the same time, changeless and self-sustaining, over a period exceeding
two decades. Such an expectation seems unmindful of the rapid advances in
the social and economic order on which that legislation is founded. It seems
strange and strained to require actuarial precision from policy legislation.
DAVID A. MILLS
Labor Law—Unemployment Compensation—Work-Share Contracts.—
Department of Labor Indus., Bureau of Employment Security v. Un-
employment Compensation Bd. of Review.'—Claimant Lybarger, a chain
machine operator for Talon, Inc., was represented by Local 591 of the Inter-
national Ladies Garment Workers Union. The union employed a normal
seniority system until 1961, when economic conditions required that Talon
reduce its labor force. Instead of permanently releasing some chain machine
operators, union and employer agreed, through the collective bargaining
process, upon a "work-share" 2 plan under which the available work would
be apportioned among all of the operators. The workers with seniority
(seniors) would perform all the work until they earned $5,000, at which time
the remaining workers (juniors) would replace them. 3 Lybarger had grossed
$5,000 by October 1, 1961, when, pursuant to the plan, he was laid off despite
his expressed desire to keep working. He then applied for unemployment
40 McQuillin, supra note 24, § 12.143, at 596, citing Nelson v. City of Sioux Falls,
72 S.D. 73, 30 N.W.2d 1 (1947).
41 Id. at 597, citing People v. Swedeberg, 351 Ill. App. 121, 113 N.E.2d 849 (1953).
92 Ibid.
1 211 A.2c1 463 (Pa. 1965)
2 Theodore, Layoff, Recall, and Work-Sharing Procedures, 80 Monthly Lab. Rev.
329, 334 (1957).
3 The contract provision read:
Employees with sufficient seniority to remain at work shall be kept as operators
until the pay period when their gross earnings received from the company since
January amount to five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus-or-minus fifty ($50)
dollars. Such operators will then go on lay-off for the remainder of the year
or until all younger operators have been recalled, and additional ones are re-
quired in seniority order.
Supra note 1, at 464.
387
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
benefits under the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law. 4
 The
Bureau of Employment Security denied him benefits on the grounds that
he was voluntarily unemployed 5 and unavailable for work. 6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on a 4 to 3 decision, HELD: Ly-
barger's claim that he left work involuntarily was barred by the collective
bargaining agreement provision that seniors be laid off upon earning $5,000.
Since he was thus disqualified by the voluntary quit clause,' the issue of
Lybarger's availability for work was not reached.
The majority considered the collective bargain in determining Ly-
barger's volition because it preferred an agency theory of collective bargain-
ing.8
 Emphasizing the union's role as exclusive bargaining agent for all its
members, the majority held the properly ratified agreement to be the voluntary
undertaking of each union member.
The dissenters maintained that the "factual matrix" 8 at the time of
separation, rather than the collective bargain, should be conclusive of the
worker's volition—since Lybarger desired to continue working, he could not
be classified as a voluntary quit.
The majority's determination of Lybarger's volitional status can be
criticized on conceptual and precedential grounds. For a proper conceptual
analysis, the opposing theories of the majority and dissenters should be
examined.
Jurisdictions adhering to the agency theory of the majority, thus holding
the bargain to be determinative, maintain that (1) since each member of
the union has authorized it to represent him at the bargaining table, the
resultant contract is his own undertaking, 1° (2) a refusal to bind an indi-
vidual employee by a particular term would result in the destruction of the
principle of collective bargaining," and (3) the worker who accepts the bene-
4
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, H 751-882 (1964).
5 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 802(6)(1) (1964) provides:
An employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week—
(b)(1) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without
cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . .
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 801(d) (1964) provides:
Compensation shall be payable to any employee who is or becomes unemployed,
and who-
....
(d) Is able to work and available for suitable work. 	 .
7 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 802(b)(1) (1964)
8 44 Va. L. Rev. 1343, 1346 (1958).
9 Gianfelice Unemployment Compensation Case, 396 Pa. 545, 551, 153 A.2d 906,
909 (1959).
19 Ball Bros. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 189 N.E.2d 429
(Ind. App. 1963); Standard Oil Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div.,
119 Ind. App. 576, 88 N.E.2d 567 (1949); Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962); Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co.,
252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172 (1958).
11 Ball Bros. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., supra note 10, at
431; Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., supra note 10, at 70, 89 N.W.2d at 175.
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fits of union membership should not be permitted to reject its occasional
detriment.' 2
The minority factual matrix position finds support in jurisdictions which
determine volition by looking to the actual intent of the employee at the
time of separation." These courts reject the agency approach in light of
legislative intent that application of voluntary quit provisions be limited to
separations where the decision to go or stay lies with the worker alone.''
Since a mere majority of employees can determine what the collective bargain
shall provide, these courts cannot conclude that the worker's "decision" was
his own.
It is submitted that the factual matrix approach is proper in this case.
The primary aim of unemployment compensation legislation is to aid un-
employed workers." The courts have long recognized this principle and have
attempted to advance it by liberally construing benefit provisions and strictly
construing disqualification provisions." Thus, it can be said that there is a
reluctance to deny, or a desire to grant, benefits whenever possible. Once this
intent is recognized, a court should look beyond a disqualifying collective
bargain to subjective intent, if it does not in the process disrupt the agreement
as a means of promoting employer-employee harmony.
Not all of the provisions of a collective bargain are relevant to this
harmony. If subjective intent were held to override the contract on such
matters as wages and working conditions, the contract would be meaningless
because of its very lack of collectivity. Such is not the case, however, with
terms relating to unemployment compensation. The employer has no stake in
one no longer in his employ and is comparatively indifferent to the individual's
eligibility for benefits. Therefore the agency approach should be used by
courts in most collective bargaining situations, but no reason can be seen
for refusing to treat a term as exceptional when it relates to unemployment
compensation and allowing subjective intent to control.
This conceptual analysis finds further support in the Gianfelice Unem-
ployment Compensation Case,'T a prior decision rendered by the present
court. Gianfelice was subject to a collective bargaining agreement which pro-
vided that an employee, upon reaching age sixty-eight, could continue to work
12 Standard Oil Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., supra note
10, at 581, 88 N.E.2d at 569.
13 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Thorne, 41 Ala. App. 331, 133 So. 2d 709 (1961), cert.
denied, 272 Ala, 709, 133 So. 2d 713 (1961); Employment Security Comm'n v. Magma
Copper Co., 90 Ariz. 104, 366 P.2d 84 (1961); Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review,
Div, of Employment Security, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953).
'4 Id. at 435, 100 A.2d at 289.
15 General Elec. Co. v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 207 N.E.2d 289,
291 (Mass. 1965) ; Nunamaker v. United States Steel Corp., 2 Ohio St. 2d 55, 57, 206
N.E.2d 206, 207-08 (1965); Milwaukee Transformer Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d
502, 511, 126 N.W.2d 6, 12 (1964).
10
 Tennessee, Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Martin, 33 Ala. App. 502, 504-05, 36 So. 2d 535,
536 (1948), aff'd, 251 Ala. 153, 36 So. 2d 547 (1948); Nordling v. Ford Motor Co.,
231 Minn. 68, 76-77, 42 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (1950); Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging
Co. v. State Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 168 Ore, 614, 620, 126 P.2d 37, 40
(1942).
17
 Gianfelice Unemployment Compensation Case, 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959).
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only with the employer's consent. Gianfelice applied for unemployment com-
pensation when his employer refused this consent. The court awarded benefits,
holding that the collective bargaining agreement was not determinative of the
claimant's volition because the circumstances surrounding the collective bar-
gain would not support a conclusion that Gianfelice intended to quit. It
focused instead on his subjective intent at the time of separation and, since
he had expressed a desire to continue working, concluded that he was an in-
voluntary quills
The majority in the instant case attempted to distinguish Gianfelice on
the purposes and effects of the collective bargaining agreements. It pointed
out that in the present case unemployment is intentionally created, the em-
ployer and union are attempting to use the common fund to serve their, own
ends, and there is a recurrent systematic removal of capital from the fund." )
Although these distinctions may exist, they do not avoid the thrust of
Glanfelice. The problem with which Gianfelice was concerned exists in the
instant case if the surrounding circumstances indicate that the terms of the
collective bargain are being used to impute an intent to quit where none exists
in fact.
Do the facts surrounding the collective bargain indicate that Lybarger
intended to quit in accordance with the terms of the bargain? Clearly the
answer is no. Lybarger could gain nothing by the agreement and in fact lost
three months' work. Only a motive of magnanimity could support an intent
to quit and no such motive can be inferred here. Since the facts fail to evidence
an intent coextensive with the terms of the agreement, Gianfelice requires
that the court ignore the bargain and focus on the individual's intent at the
time of separation. Therefore Lybarger's expressed desire to continue working
should preclude his classification as a voluntary quit.
However, Lybarger's status as an involuntary quit should not auto-
matically lead to an award of benefits. A consideration of the unique policy
problems presented by work-share plans is necessary.
Two problems embodied in work-share arrangements which weigh against
awarding benefits are (1) an allowance of benefits may promote a scheme by
which employer and union could use the fund for their own gain," and (2)
an award of benefits results in an added drain on the fund which may threaten
its solvency 21
Unemployment compensation is not intended to subsidize the employer
in the operation of his business nor the union in the protection of its mem-
bers." Payments to work-share participants may, however, have this result
because both union and employer receive substantial benefits themselves. The
employer retains the total work force and the latter is better trained because
18 Id. at 551-52, 153 A.2d at 910.
18 Supra note 1, at 468-70.
20 Supra note 1, at 469-70.
21 Supra note 1, at 469; Walker, Unemployment Insurance and Current Unemploy-
ment Problems: Work-Sharing—An Answer, 16 Lab. L.J. 243, 250 (1965).
n E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 95A, 2 (1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43,
	 752 (1964);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 50.01.010 (1962).
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the juniors, afforded a chance to work increase their skills.23 The Union
maximizes income from dues because its membership is not depleted.
Since the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law limits to thirty
weeks the period over which an individual can collect benefits, 24 the work-
share plan results in an added drain on the fund. If the normal seniority
system were in effect, the seniors would be employed for the entire year and
the juniors would become ineligible for benefits after thirty weeks. Under the
plan, however, the juniors return to work shortly after they become ineligible.
Thus, whenever the juniors exhaust their eligibilty, any payments to the
seniors are over and above what normally would be exacted from the fund.
This added drain should be examined for its effect on other parties with
interests in the fund: other employers who finance it, other workers who may
in the future apply for benefits, and the community which depends on the
payments from the fund to reduce the depressionary effect of unemployment
on the economy.25
An employer's contribution to the fund is based on the amount of use
his own employees make of it 2s The amount collected by the employees of
others would seem to have no adverse effect on him. If, however, the in-
creased drain continues unchecked for any substantial period, all employers
might be required to increase their contributions in order to preserve the fund.
It is clear, moreover, that disbursements affecting the solvency of
the fund work to the disadvantage of both the workers who may later need
benefits and the community which depends on the purchasing power of
those workers.
A court in a work-share case may decide that the foregoing considerations
militate against awarding benefits. On the other hand, it may be convinced
that the claimant's need outweighs these considerations. If the court adopts
the latter course, and the legislature wishes to continue awarding benefits to
work-share participants, the problem inevitably becomes one of how to finance
the plan. The burden of compensating for the excess outlay could be imposed
on the business community or the employer and the union (separately or
jointly) . 27
25 Supra note 1, at 469 n.15.
24 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43,	 804(e) (1964); United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
as of August 1954, at 70 (1954). Maximum weeks of benefits vary from 16 to 26%2 weeks,
most frequently 2634 weeks.
25 Walker, supra note 21, at 244.
26 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, supra
note 24, at 17:
All state laws have in effect some system of experience rating by which individual
employers' contribution rates are varied from the standard rate on the basis of
their experience with unemployment risk.
See also Comment, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 849, 851-52 (1953).,
27 One writer has proposed that the employees who share the work divide the benefit
that would have been paid to them if the employer had reduced his work force by
permanent layoffs. Compare Wettick, Modifying Unemployment Compensation Acts to
Remove Obstacles to Work-Sharing, ,15 Lab. L.J. 702 (1964), with Walker, Unem-
ployment Insurance and Current Unemployment Problems: Work-Sharing--An Answer,
16 Lab. L.J. 243 (1965).
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There seems to be no good reason for increasing the contribution of all
employers to offset payments which result from a plan intentionally created
by one of them. A more equitable solution would be to assess the employer
or the union, whichever was the proponent of the plan, for the deficit. How-
ever, legislation to this effect would be unworkable since, due to the com-
plexities of the collective bargaining process, the proponent can seldom be
ascertained.
Perhaps the cost could be borne by the employer on the theory that such
a plan is a type of fringe benefit and that the employer is in a better financial
position to bear the expense. By so excluding the union from contributing,
this method protects the seniors from the inequitable burden of sharing in
the cost of work-share. But, conversely, in many instances, this plan may
result in the inequity of imposing the total cost upon an employer who did
not favor the plan.
Alternatively, the cost could be divided between both the union and the
employer. Under such a plan, the proponent of necessity would be bearing at
least part of the expense, and the inequity of the opponent subsidizing a plan
he did not want would be mitigated by the benefits he receives under work-
share.
It seems that the court actually disqualified Lybarger because it was
convinced that his need did not outweigh the policy problems inherent in
work-share. If this is the case their result cannot be criticized. But a more
direct and defensible approach would have been to admit that Lybarger was
an involuntary quit and then to set forth the policy problems as their basis
for disqualification.
DAVID T. GARVEY
Trade Regulation—Section 7 of the Clayton Act—Conglomerate Ac-
quisitions—"Deep-Pocket" Theory.—Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania
Elec. Prods., Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC.2—In the Smith-Victor case,
Sylvania greatly enhanced its over-all size and wealth through a series of
acquisitions commencing in 1936. In 1960, Sylvania entered the amateur
photo-lighting equipment market, a Iine of commerce in which all the com-
petitors were small. Smith-Victor, one of the competitors, brought this action
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,3
 alleging that the emergence of a deep-
pocket competitor, Sylvania, in its line of commerce would substantially lessen
1 242 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. III. 1965).
2
 347 F,2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
3
 64- Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The
pertinent part of § 7 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part•of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
392
